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Abstract
We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strate-
gies with adaptable preferences. The games can be used to model economic markets, ecosystems or
distributed control. Diversity of initial preferences of strategies is introduced by randomly assigning
biases to the strategies of different agents. We find that diversity among the agents reduces their
maladaptive behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with diversity for the variance and other
parameters such as the convergence time, the fraction of fickle agents, and the variance of wealth,
illustrating their dynamical origin. When diversity increases, the scaling dynamics is modified by
kinetic sampling and waiting effects. Analyses yield excellent agreement with simulations.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le, 05.70.Ln, 05.40.-a
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I. INTRODUCTION
Many natural and artificial systems involve interacting agents, each making indepen-
dent decisions to compete for limited resources, but globally exhibit coordinated behavior
through their mutual adaptation [1, 2, 3, 4]. Examples include the formation of ecological
patterns due to the competition of predators hunting for food, the price adjustment due to
the competition of buyers or sellers in economic markets, and the load adjustment due to
the competition of distributed controllers of packet flows in computer networks. While a
standard approach is to analyse the steady state behavior of the system described by the
Nash equilibria [5], it is legitimate to consider how the steady state is approached, since such
processes are dynamical in nature, and the approach may be interfered by the presence of
periodic, chaotic or metastable attractors. Dynamical studies are especially relevant when
one considers the effects of changing environment, such as that in economics or distributed
control.
The recently proposed Minority Games (MG) are prototypes of such multi-agent systems
[2]. Extensive studies have revealed the steady-state properties of the game when the com-
plexity of the agents is high [6]. On the other hand, the dynamical nature of the adaptive
processes is revealed when the complexity of the agents is low, wherein the final states of
the system depend on the initial conditions, and the system often ends up with large fluctu-
ations at final states, much remote from the efficient state predicted by equilibrium studies
[6, 7]. The large fluctuations in the original MG is related to the uniformly zero preference of
strategies for all agents. This has to be re-examined for at least two reasons. First, when the
game is used to model economic systems, it is not realistic to expect that all agents have the
same preference when they enter the market. Rather, the agents have their own preferences
according to their individual objectives, expectations and available capital. For example,
some have stronger inclinations towards aggressive strategies, and others more conservative.
Furthermore, in games which use public information only, identical initial preferences imply
that different agents would maintain identical preferences of strategies at all subsequent
steps of the game, which is again unlikely. Second, when the game is used to model dis-
tributed control in multi-agent systems, identical preferences of strategies of the agents lead
to maladaptive behavior, which refers to the bursts of the population’s decisions due to the
agents’ premature rush to certain state [8, 9]. As a result, the population difference between
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the majority and minority groups is large. For economic markets, this corresponds to large
price fluctuations; for distributed control, this corresponds to an uneven resource allocation;
both imply low system efficiency. Hence, maladaptation hinders the attainment of optimal
system efficiency.
There have been many attempts to improve the system efficiency. For example, thermal
noise [10] or biased strategies [11] are found to reduce the fluctuations. More relevant to this
work, there were indications that maladaptation can be reduced by appropriate choices of
the initial condition at the low complexity phase. The dependence of initial conditions was
noted in the replica approach to the exogenous MG [6]. System efficiency can be improved by
random initial conditions in the original MG [12], or systems driven by vectorized external
information [7]. It was noted that the reduced variance can be obtained hysteretically
by quasistatic increase and decrease of the complexity from an unbiased initial condition,
clearly demonstrating the non-equilibrium nature of this phenomenon [13]. By generalizing
the strategy evaluation mechanism to the batch mode, and using a payoff function linear in
the winning margin, the generating functional analysis showed that fluctuations are reduced
by biased starts of the agents’ strategy payoff valuations [14]. The same is valid in its noisy
extension [15]. However, no systematic studies about the effects of random biases have been
made.
In this paper, we consider the effects of randomness in the initial preferences of strategies
among the agents. Initial conditions can be selected to make the system dynamics completely
deterministic, thus yielding highly precise simulation results useful for refined comparison
with theories. As we shall see, a consequence of this diversity is that agents sharing common
strategies are less likely to adopt them at the same time, and maladaptation is reduced.
This results in an improved system efficiency, as reflected by the reduced variance of the
population decisions. We find interesting scaling relations with the diversity for the variance,
and a number of dynamical parameters, such as the convergence time, the fraction of fickle
agents, and the variance of wealth, illustrating their dynamical origin. When diversity
increases, we find that the scaling dynamics is modified by a sampling mechanism self-
imposed by the requirement of the dynamics to stay in the attractor, an effect we term
kinetic sampling. Preliminary results have been sketched in [16].
This paper is organized as follows. After introducing the Minority Game in Section II,
we discuss the variation of fluctuations when diversity increases, identifying 3 regimes of
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behavior: multinomial, scaling, and kinetic sampling, analyzed in Sections III to V respec-
tively. Besides the fluctuations, other dynamical properties, namely, the fraction of fickle
agents, the convergence time, and the variance of wealth, are discussed in Sections VI to
VIII respectively. The paper is concluded in Section IX.
II. THE MINORITY GAME
We consider a population of N agents competing selfishly to be in the minority group
in an environment of limited resources, N being odd [2]. Each of the N agents can make a
decision 1 or 0 at each time step, and the minority group wins. For typical control tasks such
as the distribution of shared resources, the decisions 1 and 0 may represent two atternative
resources, so that less agents utilizing a resource implies more abundance. For economic
markets, the decisions 1 and 0 correspond to buying and selling respectively, so that the
buyers can win by belonging to the minority group, as a consequence of the price being
pushed down when supply is greater than demand, and vice versa.
Each agent makes her decision independently according to her own finite set of strategies,
randomly picked before the game starts. Each of her s strategies is based on the history of
the game, which is the time series of the winning bits in the most recent m steps. Hence,
m is the memory size. There are D ≡ 2m possible histories, thus D is the dimension of the
strategy space. While most previous work considered the case D ∼ N , we will mainly study
the case m & 1 in this paper. As we shall see, this simplification enables us to make detailed
analysis of the system, revealing many new features.
A strategy is then a Boolean function which maps each of the D histories to decisions 1
or 0. Denoting the winning state at time t by σ(t) (σ(t) = 1, 0), we can convert an m-bit
history σ(t−m+ 1), · · · , σ(t) to an integer historical state µ∗(t) of modulo D, given by
µ∗(t) =
m−1∑
t′=0
σ(t− t′)2t′ , (1)
and the Boolean decisions of strategy a responding to input state µ are denoted by σµa = 1, 0,
corresponding to the binary decisions ξµa = ±1 via ξµa ≡ 2σµa − 1. For subsequent analyses
of strategies, the label a of a strategy is given by an integer between 0 and 2D − 1, where
a =
D−1∑
µ=0
σµa2
D−1−µ. (2)
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The success of a strategy is measured by its cumulative payoff (also called virtual point
in the literature), which increases (decreases) by 1 if it indicates a winning (losing) decision
at a time step. Note that the payoffs attributed to the strategies at each step depend only
on the signs of the decisions, and is independent of the magnitude of the winning margins.
This is called the step payoff, and follows the original version of the MG [2]. Many recent
studies used payoffs with magnitudes increasing with the difference between the majority
and minority population. In particular, payoffs that are linear in the population difference
are called linear payoffs, and are found convenient in the application of analytical techniques
such as the replica method [6] or the generating functional analysis [14]. In the analysis of
this paper, the step payoff is more convenient.
At each time step, each agent chooses, out of her s strategies, the one with the highest
cumulative payoff (updated every step irrespective of whether it is adopted or not) and
makes decisions accordingly. The difference between the total number of winning and losing
decisions of an agent up to a time step is called her wealth at that time. The long-term goal
of an agent is to maximize her wealth.
To model diversity among the agents, the agents may enter the game with diverse pref-
erences of their strategies. This means that each agent has random integer biases to the
initial cumulative payoffs of each of her s strategies. We are interested in how the extent
of randomness affects the system behavior, and there are many choices of the bias distribu-
tion. A natural choice is the multinomial distribution, which can be modeled by assigning
integer biases to the s strategies of each agent, which add up to an odd integer R. Then,
the biased payoff of a strategy of an agent obeys a multinomial distribution with mean R/s
and variance R(s− 1)/s2. The ratio ρ ≡ R/N is referred to as the diversity.
For the binomial case s = 2 and odd R, which will be studied here, no two strategies
have the same cumulative payoffs throughout the game. Hence there are no ties, and the
dynamics of the game is deterministic, resulting in highly precise simulation results useful
for refined comparison with theories. This is in contrast with previous versions of the game,
which correspond to the special case of R = 0.
Furthermore, for an agent holding strategies a and b (with a < b), the biases affect her
decisions only through the bias difference ω of strategy a with respect to b. Hence we let
Sab(ω) be the number of agents holding strategies a and b, where the bias of strategy a is
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displaced by ω with respect to b, and its disordered average is
〈Sab(ω)〉 = N
22D−1
1
2R
(
R
R−ω
2
)
. (3)
To describe the macroscopic dynamics of the system, we define the D-dimensional phase
space with the components Aµ(t), which is the fraction of agents making decision 1 respond-
ing to input µ of their used strategies, subtracted by that for decision 0. While only one of
the D components corresponds to the historical state µ∗(t) of the system, the augmentation
to D components is necessary to describe the attractor structure and the transient behavior
of the system dynamics.
The key to analysing the system dynamics is the observation that the cumulative payoffs
of all strategies displace by exactly the same amount when the game proceeds, though their
initial values may be different. Hence for a given strategy pair, the profile of the cumulative
payoff distribution remains binomial, but the peak position shifts with the game dynamics.
Hence once the cumulative payoffs are known, the state location in the D-dimensional phase
space is given by
Aµ(t) =
1
N
∑
a<b,ω
Sab(ω) {Θ[ω + Ωa(t)− Ωb(t)]ξµa +Θ[−ω − Ωa(t) + Ωb(t)]ξµb }
+
1
N
∑
a
Saξ
µ
a , (4)
where Ωa(t) is the cumulative payoff of strategy a at time t, Sa is the number of agents
holding 2 identical strategies labelled a, and Θ(x) is the step function of x. For agents
holding non-identical strategies a < b, the agents make decision according to strategy a if
ω+Ωa(t)−Ωb(t) > 0, and strategy b otherwise. Hence ω+Ωa(t)−Ωb(t) is referred to as the
preference of a with respect to b. In turn, the cumulative payoff of a strategy a is updated
by
Ωa(t+ 1) = Ωa(t)− ξµ∗(t)a sgnAµ
∗(t)(t). (5)
Fig. 1(a) illustrates the convergence to the attractor for the visualizable case of m =
1. The dynamics proceeds in the direction which tends to reduce the magnitude of the
components of Aµ(t) [6]. However, a certain amount of maladaptation always exists in the
system, so that the components of Aµ(t) overshoot, resulting in periodic attractors of period
2D, as reported in the literature [17, 18]. The state evolution is given by the integer equation
µ∗(t + 1) = mod(2µ∗(t) + σ(t), D), (6)
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so that every state µ appears as historical states two times in a steady-state period, with
σ(t) appearing as 0 and 1, each exactly once. One occurence brings Aµ from positive to
negative, and another bringing it back from negative to positive, thus completing a cycle.
The components keep on oscillating, but never reach zero. This results in an antipersistent
time series [19]. For the example in Fig. 1(a), the steady state is described by the sequence
µ(t) = σ(t) = 0, 1, 1, 0, (7)
where one notes that both states 0 and 1 are followed by 0 and 1 once each.
For m = 2, there are 2 attractor sequences as shown in Fig. 1(b),
µ(t) = 0, 1, 3, 3, 2, 1, 2, 0, (8)
and
µ(t) = 0, 1, 2, 1, 3, 3, 2, 0. (9)
Again, one notes that each of the states 0, 1, 2, 3 are followed by an even (σ(t) = 0) and
an odd state (σ(t) = 1) once each. Furthermore, we note that the attractor sequences in
Eqs. (8) and (9) are related by the conjugation symmetry µ(t)→ 3−µ(t). For general values
of m, an attractor sequence can be obtained by starting with the state µ∗(0) = σ(0) = 0,
and assigning σ(t) = 1 if the value of µ∗(t) appears the first time in the sequence, and
0 the second time, such as the attracters in Eq. (7) and (8). In general, other attractor
sequences can be obtained by computer search, and the number of attractor sequences can
be verified to be 2D/2D, which forms the de Bruijn sequence in terms of m, corresponding
to the number of distinct ring configurations of length 2D, for which all sub-strings of length
m+ 1 are distinct [20].
The population averages of the decisions oscillate around 0 at the steady state. Since a
large difference between the majority and minority populations implies inefficient resource
allocation, the inefficiency of the game is often characterized by the normalized variance
σ2/N of the population making decision 1 at the steady state. Since this population size at
time t is given by N(1 −Aµ∗(t))/2, we have
σ2
N
= lim
t→∞
N
4
〈[Aµ∗(t)− 〈Aµ∗(t)〉t]2〉t, (10)
where 〈 〉t denotes time average at the steady state.
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FIG. 1: (a) The state motion of a sample in the phase space for m = 1, s = 2, N = 1023 and
R = 16383. Empty dots: transient states. Solid dots: attractor states. (b) The attractors in the
phase subspace of A1 and A2 for m = 2. 6 of the 8 states remain in the second quadrant of the
subspace formed by A3 and A0. The location of the other 2 states are indicated in the A3 and A0
subspace, instead of the A1 and A2 subspace. The numbers in the circles denote the elements of
the attractor sequences in Eqs. (8) and (9).
As shown in Fig. 2, the variance σ2/N of the population for decision 1 scales as a function
of the complexity α ≡ D/N , agreeing with previous observations [8]. When α is small, games
with increasing complexity create time series of decreasing fluctuations. A phase transition
takes place around αc ≈ 0.3, after which it increases gradually to the limit of random
decisions, with σ2/N = 0.25. When α < αc, the occurences of decision 1 and 0 responding
to a given historical state µ are equal, and is referred to as the symmetric phase [21]. On
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ρ = R/N
FIG. 2: The dependence of the variance of the population making decision + on the complexity
for different diversities at s = 2 averaged over 128 samples. The horizontal dotted line is the limit
of random decisions.
the other hand, in the asymmetric phase above αc, the occurences of decisions are biased
for at least some history µ.
Figure 2 also shows the data collapse of the variance for different values of diversity ρ. It
is observed that the variance decreases significantly with diversity in the symmetric phase,
and remains unaffected in the asymmetric phase [22]. Furthermore, for a game efficiency
prescribed by a given variance σ2/N , the required complexity of the agents is much reduced.
The dependence of the variance on the diversity is further shown in Figs. 3 and 4 for
memory sizes m = 1 and m = 2 respectively. The following three regimes can be identified
and explained in Sections III to V respectively: (a) multinomial regime: when ρ ∼ N−1,
σ2/N ∼ N with proportionality constants dependent on m; (b) scaling regime: when ρ ∼ 1,
σ2/N ∼ ρ−1 with proportionality constants independent of m for m not too large; (c)
kinetic sampling regime: when ρ ∼ N , σ2/N deviates above the scaling with ρ−1 due to
kinetic sampling effects as explained below, and the scaling is given by σ2/N ∼ fm(∆)/N ,
where ∆ is the kinetic step size given by
∆ ≡ N
√
2
piR
=
√
2N
piρ
, (11)
and fm is a function dependent on the memory size m.
To analyse the behavior in these regimes, we derive the following expression for the step
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FIG. 3: The dependence of the variance of the population making decision + on the diversity at
m = 1 and s = 2. Symbols: simulation results averaged over 1024 samples. Solid lines: theory.
Dashed-dotted line: scaling prediction.
10−5 10−3 10−1 101 103
ρ = R/N
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N = 511, m = 1
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FIG. 4: The dependence of the variance of the population making decision + on the diversity at
m = 2 and s = 2. Notations are the same as those of Fig. 3. Inset: A comparison of the variances
at m = 1 and m = 2 in Figs. 3 and 4.
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∆Aµ(t) ≡ Aµ(t+ 1)−Aµ(t), at time t. Using Eq. (4), we have
∆Aµ(t) =
1
N
∑
a<b,ω
Sab(ω){Θ[ω+Ωa(t+1)−Ωb(t+1)]−Θ[ω+Ωa(t)−Ωb(t)]}(ξµa −ξµb ). (12)
Since the arguments of the step functions are odd integers, nonzero contributions to Eq. (12)
come from terms with ω+Ωa(t+1)−Ωb(t+1) = ±1 and ω+Ωa(t)−Ωb(t) = ∓1. Using Eq. (5),
the two arguments differ by −(ξµa − ξµb )sgnAµ(t) with µ = µ∗(t). Hence the conditions for
nonzero contributions become equivalent to ω+Ωa(t)−Ωb(t) = ∓1 and ξµa−ξµb = ∓2sgnAµ(t)
for µ = µ∗(t). This reduces the steps to
∆Aµ(t) =
1
N
∑
a<b,ω,±
Sab(ω)δ(ω+Ωa(t)−Ωb(t)±1)δ(ξµa − ξµb ±2sgnAµ(t))(±)(ξµa − ξµb ), (13)
where µ = µ∗(t), and δ(n) = 1 if n = 0, and 0 otherwise. For µ = µ∗(t), this can be further
simplified to
∆Aµ(t) = −sgnAµ(t) 2
N
∑
a<b,±
Sab(∓1− Ωa(t) + Ωb(t))δ(ξµa − ξµb ± 2sgnAµ(t)), (14)
To interpret this result, we note that changes in Aµ(t) are only contributed by fickle agents
with marginal preferences of their strategies. That is, those with ω + Ωα(t) − Ωβ(t) = ±1
and ξµα − ξµβ = ∓2sgnAµ(t) for µ = µ∗(t). Furthermore, the step points in the direction that
reduces the magnitude of Aµ(t).
Similarly, the steps along the direction ν other than the historical state µ∗(t) are given
by
∆Aν(t) =
1
N
∑
a<b,±
Sab(∓1− Ωa(t) + Ωb(t))δ(ξµa − ξµb ± 2sgnAµ(t))(±)(ξνa − ξνb ) (15)
where µ = µ∗(t). This shows that the steps along the non-historical direction are contributed
by the subset of those fickle agents that contribute to the step along the historical direction,
and they can be positive or negative.
Next we consider the disordered average of the steps in Eq. (13). For this purpose, it is
convenient to decompose the cumulative payoffs as
Ωa(t) =
∑
µ
kµ(t)ξ
µ
a , (16)
where kµ(t) is the number of wins minus losses of decision 1 up to time t when the game
responded to history µ. Since there are 2D variables of Ωa(t) and D variables of kµ(t), this
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decomposition greatly simplifies the analysis, and describes explicity how Ωa(t) depends on
the strategy decisions. Introducing the integral representation of the Kronecka delta for the
preference, we can factorize the contributions of Ωa(t)−Ωb(t) into a product over the states,
δ(ω + Ωa(t)− Ωb(t)± 1) =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
eiθ(ω±1)
∏
λ
eiθkλ(ξ
λ
a−ξ
λ
b
), (17)
where the explicit dependence on t is omitted for convenience here and in the subsequent
derivation. Using the identities
δ(ξµa − ξµb ± 2sgnAµ(t)) =
1
4
[1∓ (ξµa − ξµb )sgnAµ − ξµa ξµb ], (18)
eiφ(ξ
µ
a−ξ
µ
b
) = cos2 φ+ (ξµa − ξµb )i sinφ cosφ+ ξµa ξµb sin2 φ, (19)
and introducing the average in Eq. (3), we obtain the following factorized expression from
Eq. (13) for µ = µ∗(t),
〈∆Aµ(t)〉 = 1
22D−1
∑
a<b,ω,±
(
R
R−ω
2
)
1
2R
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
eiθ(ω±1)
1
4
[1∓ (ξµa − ξµb )sgnAµ − ξµa ξµb ](±)(ξµa − ξµb )
[cos2 kµθ + (ξ
µ
a − ξµb )i sin kµθ cos kµθ + ξµa ξµb sin2 kµθ]∏
λ6=µ
[cos2 kλθ + (ξ
λ
a − ξλb )i sin kλθ cos kλθ + ξλaξλb sin2 kλθ]. (20)
The summation over a < b can now be replaced by half times the independent summations
over a and b. Noting that for given states µ, ν . . . λ,
∑
a
ξµa ξ
ν
a · · · ξλa = 0, (21)
we find that all terms in the expansion of Eq. (20) vanish if they contain unpaired decisions
ξνa or ξ
ν
b . The final result is
〈∆Aµ(t)〉 = −sgnAµ
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
cosR θ cos(2kµ − sgnAµ)θ
∏
ν 6=µ
cos2 kνθ. (22)
Eq. (22) describes the change induced by the payoff component kµ(t) incremented by
−sgnAµ(t). Since the step size depends on time implicitly through the payoff components,
the sum of all changes induced by kµ(t) incremented from 0 yields
〈Aµ(t)− Aµ(0)〉 =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
cosR θ
sin kµθ cos kµθ
sin θ
∏
ν 6=µ
cos2 kνθ. (23)
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Similarly, the steps along the non-historical direction are given by
〈∆Aν(t)〉 =
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
cosR θ sin kνθ cos kνθ sin(2kµsgnA
µ − 1)θ
∏
λ6=µν
cos2 kλθ, (24)
where ν 6= µ∗(t) = µ. The same result can be obtained from Eq. (23) by considering the
difference of 2 equations when one of the states labeled ν become historical and kν changes
by −sgnAν .
III. THE MULTINOMIAL REGIME
When ρ ∼ N−1, or R ∼ 1, there is a finite number of clusters of agents who make
identical decisions throughout the game. Since there are many agents in a typical cluster,
their identical decisions will cause large fluctuations in their behavior. Consider the example
of m = 1 and R = 1. There are only 4 strategies. For a pair of distinct strategies, there is an
average of N/8 agents picking them, and N/16 agents in each cluster with biases ±1. As a
result, we have σ2/N ∼ N . The proportionality constant depends on m, and is sensitive to
the profile of the bias distribution. Since we consider the multinomial distribution in Eq. (3)
in this paper, we call this the multinomial regime. Another choice in the literature is the
bimodal distribution [7, 12, 13, 14, 15], which may have different behavior.
Consider the case m = 1. Eqs. (22) and (24) show that the step size 〈∆Aµ(t)〉 ∼ O(1)
and is thus self-averaging. Since Aµ(0) is Gaussian with variance N−1, the values of Aµ(t)
at the attractors can be computed to O(1). Depending on the initial position A(0) ≡
(A1(0), A0(0)), 4 attractors can be identified. For example, if A(0) lies in the first quadrant,
and the initial historical state is 0, then the payoff components k ≡ (k1(t), k0(t)) at the
attractor are given by k(0) = (0, 0), k(1) = (−1, 0), k(2) = (−1,−1), k(3) = (−1, 0),
provided that when ∆Aµ(t) = 0 to order 1, ∆Aµ(t) is also equal to 0 to order N−1/2.
Analysis can be simplified by noting that when the payoff components kµ(t) are restricted
to the values 0 and ±1, Eq. (23) can be written as
Aµ(t) = kµ
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
(cos θ)[R+1+2
∑
ν 6=µ |kν |] = kµc[R+1+2
∑
ν 6=µ |kν |]
, (25)
where cn ≡ 2−n
(
n
n/2
)
for even integer n, and we have used the facts that Aµ(t) is self-
averaging, Aµ(0) ∼ N−1/2. The locations of the 4 attractors are shown in Fig. 5 and
summarised in Table I.
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FIG. 5: (a-d) The 4 attractors for m = 1 and s = 2 in the multinomial regime. The time steps
are relabeled with t = 0 corresponding to the state with µ∗(t) = 0 and µ∗(t+ 1) = 1.
The variance of Aµ(t) of the historical states µ = µ∗(t), averaged over the period for each
of the 4 attractors, can be obtained from Table I. The variance of decisions in Eq. (10),
averaged over the 4 attractors, is then given by
σ2
N
=
N
128
(7c2R+1 − 2cR+1cR+3 + 7c2R+3). (26)
The theoretical values are compared with simulation results for the first 3 points of each
curve corresponding to given values of N in Fig. 3. The agreement is excellent. Note that
the variance in this regime deviates from the scaling relation with ρ−1 in the next regime,
as evident from the splaying down from the linear relation in Fig. 3. However, when R≫ 1,
cR+1 ≈ cR+3 ≈
√
2/piR, σ2/N reduces to 3/16piρ, showing that the deviation from the ρ−1
scaling gradually vanishes.
Now consider the case m = 2. Starting from initial positions near the origin of the 4-
dimensional phase space, we consider the attractors resulting from the 16 quadrants and 4
initial states. We find 16 attractors for the attractor sequence in Eq. (8). The positions of one
of the attractors are summarised in Table II, and the values of Aµ(t) for the historical states
µ = µ∗(t), which are used to compute the variance of decisions in Eq. (10) are summarised
in Table III. Averaging over the period and over the attractors, the variance of decisions in
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t k1(t) k0(t) A
1(t) A0(t) k1(t) k0(t) A
1(t) A0(t)
(a) (b)
0 −1 −1 −cR+3 −cR+3∗ 0 −1 0± −cR+1∗
1 −1 0 −cR+1∗ 0+ 0 0 0−∗ 0+
2 0 0 0+
∗
0± 1 0 cR+1
∗ 0±
3 −1 0 −cR+1 0+∗ 0 0 0− 0+∗
(c) (d)
0 0 0 0± 0−
∗ −1 0 −cR+1 0−∗
1 0 1 0−
∗
cR+1 −1 1 −cR+3∗ cR+3
2 1 1 cR+3
∗ cR+3 0 1 0
+∗ cR+1
3 0 1 0− cR+1
∗ −1 1 −cR+3 cR+3∗
TABLE I: The 4 attractors for m = 1, s = 2 in the multinomial regime. In Tables I and II, the
time steps are relabeled with t = 0 corresponding to the state with µ∗(t) = 0 and µ∗(t+1) = 1, the
superscripts ± of the value 0 indicate the possible signs to order N−1/2, and Aµ(t) with asterisks
correspond to the historical states, which are used to compute the variance of decisions in Eq. (10).
Eq. (10) becomes
σ2
N
=
N
1024
(14c2R+7 + 41c
2
R+5 + 42c
2
R+3 + 15c
2
R+1
+2cR+7cR+5 − 2cR+7cR+3 + 2cR+5cR+3 − 2cR+5cR+1). (27)
Since the attractor sequence in Eq. (9) is related to Eq. (8) by conjugation symmetry, this
expression is already the sample average of the variance. Again, the theoretical values of
the first 3 points of each curve in Fig. 4 have an excellent agreement with the simulation
results, and deviates from the ρ−1 scaling in the next regime. When R≫ 1, cR+1 ≈ cR+3 ≈
cR+5 ≈ cR+7 ≈
√
2/piR, σ2/N approaches 7/32piρ.
The variance of decisions for higher values of m can be obtained by exhaustive computer
search starting from the 2D quadrants of the phase space and the D initial states. Since the
number of cases grows rapidly with D, one may use a Monte Carlo sampling of the initial
conditions to determine the variance.
Before we close this section, we remark that the periodic average of the decisions Aµ(t)
at the historical states µ = µ∗(t) have a vanishing sample average, but the periodic average
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t k0 k1 k2 k3 A
0 A1 A2 A3
0 0 0 0 0 0−
∗
0± 0± 0±
1 1 0 0 0 cR+1 0
−∗ 0± 0±
2 1 1 0 0 cR+3 cR+3 0
± 0−
∗
3 1 1 0 1 cR+5 cR+5 0
± cR+5
∗
4 1 1 0 0 cR+3 cR+3 0
−∗ 0±
5 1 1 1 0 cR+5 cR+5
∗ cR+5 0
±
6 1 0 1 0 cR+3 0
± cR+3
∗ 0±
7 1 0 0 0 cR+1
∗ 0± 0± 0±
TABLE II: An atractor for m = 2, s = 2 in the multinomial regime with the sequence in Eq. (8).
does not necessarily vanish for individual samples. For example, the attractor (a) in Table I
has a periodic average of 〈Aµ(t)〉 = −(cR+1+ cR+3)/2 at the historical states µ = µ∗(t). The
variance is often regarded as a measure of the system efficiency, based on the observation that
the average decisions vanish at high values of m [2, 8, 21]. However, this is not the case for
the low values of m we are studying. In the context of market modeling, a nonzero periodic
average of decisions indicates the existence of arbitrage opportunities, and in the context
of modeling multi-agent control, it means that there is an imbalance in the utilization of
resources. Hence the variance cannot be regarded as an intrinsic measure of global efficiency.
Nevertheless, the phase space motion points in the direction of reducing the winning margin,
as seen in Eq. (14), which traps the attractors around the origin, as shown in Figs. 1 and 5.
As a result, the average of decisions is bounded by the step sizes at the attractor, so that
small variances also imply small averages, and the variance can still be considered as a good
approximate measure of efficiency.
IV. THE SCALING REGIME
When ρ ∼ 1, the clusters of agents making identical decisions effectively become con-
tinuously distributed in their preference of strategies. Since the shift of preferences at the
attractor is much narrower than the spread-out preference distribution, the size of the clus-
ters switching strategies is effectively independent of the detailed profile of the preference
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Attractor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
µ∗(0) = 0 0− 0− 0− 0− 0− 0− 0− 0−
µ∗(1) = 1 0− 0− 0− 0− −cR+3 −cR+5 −cR+5 −cR+7
µ∗(2) = 3 0− −cR+5 0− −cR+7 0− −cR+3 0− −cR+5
µ∗(3) = 3 cR+5 0
+ cR+7 0
+ cR+3 0
+ cR+5 0
+
µ∗(4) = 2 0− 0− −cR+5 −cR+7 0− 0− −cR+3 −cR+5
µ∗(5) = 1 cR+5 cR+7 cR+3 cR+5 0
+ 0+ 0+ 0+
µ∗(6) = 2 cR+3 cR+5 0
+ 0+ cR+5 cR+7 0
+ 0+
µ∗(7) = 0 cR+1 cR+3 cR+3 cR+5 cR+3 cR+5 cR+5 cR+7
Attractor 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
µ∗(0) = 0 −cR+1 −cR+3 −cR+3 −cR+5 −cR+3 −cR+5 −cR+5 −cR+7
µ∗(1) = 1 0− 0− 0− 0− −cR+1 −cR+3 −cR+3 −cR+5
µ∗(2) = 3 0− −cR+3 0− −cR+5 0− −cR+1 0− −cR+3
µ∗(3) = 3 cR+3 0
+ cR+5 0
+ cR+1 0
+ cR+3 0
+
µ∗(4) = 2 0− 0− −cR+3 −cR+5 0− 0− −cR+1 −cR+3
µ∗(5) = 1 cR+3 cR+5 cR+1 cR+3 0
+ 0+ 0+ 0+
µ∗(6) = 2 cR+1 cR+3 0
+ 0+ cR+3 cR+5 0
+ 0+
µ∗(7) = 0 0+ 0+ 0+ 0+ 0+ 0+ 0+ 0+
TABLE III: The values of Aµ(t) for the historical states µ = µ∗(t) for the attractors with m = 2,
s = 2 in the multinomial regime in Eq. (8). The time steps are relabeled with t = 0 corresponding
to the state with µ∗(t) = 0 and µ∗(t+ 1) = 1, the superscripts ± of the value 0 indicate the signs
to order N−1/2.
distribution. For generic preference distributions, the width scales as
√
R, and hence the
size of typical clusters scales as R−1/2. This leads to the scaling of the variance σ2/N ∼ ρ−1
[23]. Compared with the typical cluster size of scaling as N in the multinomial regime, the
typical cluster size in the scaling regime only scales as
√
N . Nevertheless, it is sufficiently
numerous that agent cooperation in this regime can be described at the level of statistical
distributions of strategy preference, resulting in the scaling relation.
In the integral of Eq. (22), significant contributions only come from θ ∼ 1/√R or θ−pi ∼
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1/
√
R, so that the factor cosR θ can be approximated by exp(−Rθ2/2). This simplifies
Eq. (22) to
〈∆Aµ(t)〉 = −
√
2
piR
sgnAµ(t) (28)
for µ = µ∗(t). Since the step sizes scale as R−1/2, they remain self-averaging. Similarly,
〈∆Aµ(t)〉 = 0 using Eq. (24). The 2 cases can be summarized as
∆Aµ(t) = −δµ,µ∗(t)
√
2
piR
sgnAµ(t). (29)
This result shows that the preference distribution among agents of a given pair is effectively
a Gaussian with variance R, so that the number of agents switching strategies at time t
scales as 2 times the height of the Gaussian distribution (2 being the shift of preference per
step), which is
√
2/piR. Thus by spreading the preference distribution, diversity reduces the
step size and hence maladaptation.
As a result of Eq. (29), the motion in the phase space is rectilinear, each step only making
a move of fixed size along the direction of the historical state. Consequently, each state of
the attractor is confined in a D-dimensional hypercube of size
√
2/piR, irrespective of the
initial position of the Aµ components. This confinement enables us to compute the variance
of the decisions. Without loss of generality, let us relabel the time steps in the periodic
attractor, with t = 0 corresponding to the state with µ∗(t) = 0 and µ∗(t + 1) = 1. We
denote as tµ the step at which state µ first appears in the relabeled sequence. (For example,
t0 = 0, t1 = 1, t2 = 4 and t3 = 2 for the attractor sequence in Eq. (8).)
When state µ first appears in the attractor on or after t = 0, the winning state is
σ(tµ). Furthermore, since there is no phase space motion along the nonhistorical directions,
Aµ(tµ) = A
µ(0). Since the winning state is determined by the minority decision, we have
Aµ(0)[2σ(tµ)− 1] < 0. Similarly, when state µ appears in the attractor the second time, the
winning state is 1− σ(tµ), and Aµ(t) = Aµ(0)+ [2σ(tµ)− 1]
√
2/piR. The winning condition
imposes that Aµ(t)[1− 2σ(tµ)] < 0. Combining,
−
√
2
piR
< Aµ(0)[2σ(tµ)− 1] < 0. (30)
Suppose the game starts from the initial state Aµ0 , which are Gaussian variables with mean
0 and variance 1/N . They change in steps of size
√
2/piR until they reach the attractor,
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whose 2D historical states are then given by√
2
piR
frac
(√
piR
2
Aµ0
)
and
√
2
piR
{
frac
(√
piR
2
Aµ0
)
− 1
}
, (31)
where frac(x) represents the decimal part of x. Using Eq. (10), this corresponds to a variance
of decisions given by σ2/N = f(ρ)/2piρ, where
f(ρ) =
〈
1
D
D−1∑
µ=0


[
frac
(√
piR
2
Aµ0
)]2
− frac
(√
piR
2
Aµ0
)
+
1
2


−
{
1
D
D−1∑
µ=0
[
frac
(√
piR
2
Aµ0
)
− 1
2
]}2〉
. (32)
Since Aµ0 are independent variables, f(ρ) is simplified to
f(ρ) =
(
1− 1
D
)〈[
frac
(√
piR
2
Aµ0
)]2〉
+
1
D
〈
frac
(√
piR
2
Aµ0
)〉2
. (33)
Since Aµ0 are Gaussian variables with mean 0 and variance N
−1, we have
〈[
frac
(√
piR
2
Aµ0
)]n〉
=
∫ 1
0
dξ

 ∞∑
r=−∞
e−
(r+ξ)2
piρ√
pi2ρ

 ξn. (34)
When ρ ≪ 1, the integrals are dominated by peaks at ξ = 0 and ξ = 1, yielding
〈frac(
√
piR/2Aµ0)〉 = 〈[frac(
√
piR/2Aµ0 )]
2〉 = 1/2. As a result, f(ρ) = (1 − 1/2D)/2. On
the other hand, when ρ ≫ 1, the step sizes become much smaller than the variance of
Aµ0 , so that frac(
√
piR/2Aµ0 ) becomes a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, leading to
〈frac(
√
piR/2Aµ0)〉 = 1/2 and 〈[frac(
√
piR/2Aµ0 )]
2〉 = 1/3, resulting in (1 − 1/4D)/3 for
ρ ≫ 1. Hence f(ρ) is a smooth function of ρ varying, for example, from 3/8 to 7/24 for
m = 1. Thus σ2/N depends on ρ mainly through the step size factor 1/2piρ, whereas f(ρ)
merely provides a higher order correction to the functional dependence. This accounts for
the scaling regime in Figs. 3 and 4. Furthermore, we note that f(ρ) rapidly approaches 1/3
when m increases. Hence for general values of D, σ2/N → 1/6piρ, provided that m is not
too large. This leads to the data collapse of the variance for m = 1 and m = 2 in the inset
of Fig. 4.
Analogous to the multinomial regime, the hypercube picture implies that both the stan-
dard deviation and the average of Aµ are bounded by the step size. Hence the variance is a
sufficient measure of system efficiency.
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This result can be compared with that in [12], where it was found that the variance scales
as α1/2 in the presence of random initial conditions. A similar α1/2 scaling was also reported
for the batch MG [14]. Their results are different from ours that the variance is effectively
independent of D (where α = D/N). However, the simulation data in Fig. 2 indicates that
the difference may not be in conflict with each other. For a sufficiently large value of ρ,
say ρ = 16, the data in the regime immediately below αc appears to be consistent with a
power-law dependence with an exponent approaching 0.5, as predicted by [12, 14]. When
α reaches lower values, the variance flattens out, showing that our results are applicable to
the regime of m being not too large.
V. THE KINETIC SAMPLING REGIME
When ρ ∼ N , the average step sizes scale as N−1 and are no longer self-averaging. Rather,
Eq. (14) shows that the size of a step along the direction of historical states at time t is 2/N
times the number of agents who switch strategies at time t, which is Poisson distributed
with a mean ∆/2, implied by Eq. (28). Here ∆ is the average step size given by Eq. (11).
However, since the attractor is formed by steps which reverse the sign of Aµ, the average
step size in the attractor is larger than that in the transient state, because a long jump is
the vicinity of the attractor is more likely to get trapped.
To consider the origin of this effect, we focus in Fig. 6 on how the average number
of agents, who hold the identity strategy with σµa = µ and its complementary strategy
σµb = 1 − µ, depends on the preference ω + Ωa − Ωb, when the system reaches the steady
state in games with m = 1. Since the preferences are time dependent, we sample their
frequencies at a fixed time, say, immediately before t = 0 in the inset of Fig. 6. One would
expect that the bias distribution is reproduced. However, we find that a sharp peak exists
at ω+Ωa −Ωb = −1. This value of the preference corresponds to that of the attractor step
from t = 3 to t = 0, when at state 0, decision 0 wins and decision 1 loses, and ω + Ωa − Ωb
changes from −1 to +1. The peak at the attractor step shows that its average step is
self-organized to be larger than those of the transient steps described by the background
distribution. Similarly for m = 2, Fig. 7 shows the average number of agents who hold the
XOR strategy ξµa and its complement ξ
µ
b = −ξµa when the attractor sequence is Eq. (9). At
the attractor step immediately before t = 4 in the inset of Fig. 7, the state is 1. Decision 1
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FIG. 6: Experimental evidence of the kinetic sampling effect for m = 1: steady-state preference
distribution of the average number of agents holding the identity strategy and its complement,
immediately before t = 0, and ρ = N = 1023 and averaged over 100000 samples. Inset: The
labeling of the time steps in the attractor.
wins and decision 0 loses, changing the preference ω + Ωa − Ωb from −1 to +1, and hence
contributing to the sharp peak at ω + Ωa − Ωb = −1.
This effect that favors the cooperation of larger clusters of agents is referred to as the
kinetic sampling effect. To describe this effect, we consider the probability of Patt(∆A)
of step sizes ∆A in the attractor. For convenience, we only consider ∆Aµ > 0 for all µ.
Assuming that all states of the phase space are equally likely to be accessed by the initial
condition, we have
Patt(∆A) =
∑
A
Patt(∆A,A), (35)
where Patt(∆A,A) is the probability of finding the position A with displacement ∆A in the
attractor. Consider the example of m = 1, where there is only one step along each axis Aµ.
The sign reversal condition implies that
Patt(∆A,A) = PPoi(∆A)
∏
µ
Θ[−Aµ(Aµ +∆Aµ)], (36)
where PPoi(∆A) is the Poisson distribution of step sizes, yielding
Patt(∆A) ∝ PPoi(∆A)
∏
µ
∆Aµ. (37)
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FIG. 7: Experimental evidence of the kinetic sampling effect for m = 2: steady-state preference
distribution of the average number of agents holding the XOR strategy ξµa and its complement ξ
µ
b ,
immediately before t = 4, and ρ = N = 511 and averaged over 50000 samples. Inset: The labeling
of the time steps in the attractor.
We note that the extra factors of ∆Aµ favor large step sizes. Thus the attractor averages
〈(∆A±)2〉att, which are required for computing the variance of decisions, are given by
〈(∆A±)2〉att = 〈(∆A
±)2∆A+∆A−〉Poi
〈∆A+∆A−〉Poi . (38)
Furthermore, correlation effects come into action when the step sizes become non-self-
averaging. There are agents who contribute to both ∆A+ and ∆A−, giving rise to their
correlations. Thus, the variance of decisions is higher when correlation effects are con-
sidered. In Eq. (14), the strategies of the agents contributing to ∆A+ and ∆A− satisfy
ξ+a − ξ+b = ±2 and ξ−a − ξ−b = ∓2 respectively. Among the agents contributing to ∆A+, the
extra requirement of ξ−a − ξ−b = ∓2 implies that an average of 1/4 of them also contribute
to ∆A−. Hence, the number of agents contributing to both steps is a Poisson variable with
mean ∆/8. Similarly, the number of agents exclusive to the individual steps are Poisson
variables with means 3∆/8. Algebraically, Eq. (14) can be decomposed as
∆A± =
2
N
∑
a<b
∑
r=±1
Sab(−r − Ωa + Ωb)δ(ξ±a − ξ±b + 2r)δ(ξ∓a − ξ∓b − 2r)
+
2
N
∑
a<b
∑
r=±1
Sab(−r − Ωa + Ωb)δ(ξ±a − ξ±b + 2r)[δ(ξ∓a − ξ∓b ) + δ(ξ∓a − ξ∓b + 2r)]}. (39)
Respectively, the first and terms are equal to 2/N times the number of agents, common to
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both steps ∆A± and exclusive to the individual steps, with means ∆/8 and 3∆/8, as can
be verified by a derivation similar to that of Eq. (22) from Eq. (14). Hence the denominator
of Eq. (38) is given by
〈∆A+∆A−〉Poi = 4
N2
∑
a0,a+,a−
e−
∆
8
a0!
(
∆
8
)a0 e− 3∆8
a+!
(
3∆
8
)a+ e− 3∆8
a−!
(
3∆
8
)a−
(a0 + a+)(a0 + a−).
(40)
Expressing the moments of Poisson variables in terms of their means, we arrive at
〈∆A+∆A−〉Poi = 4
N2
[
16
(
∆
8
)2
+
∆
8
]
. (41)
Similarly, the numerator of Eq. (38) is given by
〈(∆A±)2∆A+∆A−〉Poi = 16
N4
[
256
(
∆
8
)4
+ 240
(
∆
8
)3
+ 40
(
∆
8
)2
+
∆
8
]
. (42)
Together we obtain
〈(∆A±)2〉att = 2∆
3 + 15∆2 + 20∆ + 4
N2(2∆ + 1)
. (43)
The possible attractor states are given by Aµ = mµ/N and mµ/N − ∆Aµ, where mµ =
1, 3, . . . , N∆Aµ − 1. This yields a variance of
σ2
N
=
N
4
〈
 1D
D−1∑
µ=0
[(mµ
N
)2
−∆Aµ
(mµ
N
)
+
1
2
(∆Aµ)2
]
−
[
1
D
D−1∑
µ=0
(
mµ
N
− 1
2
∆Aµ
)]2

〉
.
(44)
Averaging over the attractor states, we find
σ2
N
=
7〈(N∆A+)2〉att + 7〈(N∆A−)2〉att − 8
192N
, (45)
which gives, on combining with Eq. (43),
σ2
N
=
14∆3 + 105∆2 + 132∆ + 24
96N(2∆ + 1)
. (46)
When the diversity is low, ∆ ≫ 1, and Eq. (46) reduces to σ2/N ≡ 7/48piρ, agreeing with
the scaling result of the previous section. When ρ ∼ N , Eq. (46) has excellent agreement
with simulation results, which significantly deviate above the scaling relation, as shown in
Fig. 3.
When ρ≫ N , Eq. (46) predicts that σ2/N should approach 1/4N . This can be explained
as follows. Analysis shows that only those agents holding the identity strategy and its com-
plement can complete both hops along the A± axes after they have adjusted their preferences
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to ω + Ωa − Ωb = ±1. Since there are fewer and fewer fickle agents in the limit ρ ≫ N ,
one would expect that a single agent of this type would dominate the game dynamics, and
σ2/N would approach 1/4N .
However, as shown in Fig. 3, the simulation data approaches the limit 0.43/N when
ρ≫ N , significantly higher than 0.25/N . This discrepancy requires the consideration of the
waiting effect, which has been sketched in [16], and will be explained in details elsewhere.
Next, we turn to the kinetic sampling effects for m = 2. As shown in Fig. 1(b), the
situation is more complicated than that of m = 1 since there are two steps moving along
the direction A1 and A2. Consider the attractor sequence in Eq. (8). The step ∆A(1) can
initiate from A1 = m1/N , with m1 = −1, . . . , − N∆A(1) + 1, where for convenience the
state labels of the step sizes at time t are implicitly taken to be the historical states µ∗(t).
Similarly, the step ∆A(5) can initiate from A1 = m5/N , with m5 = 1, . . . , N∆A(5) − 1.
However, since the two steps are linked by steps along the direction A2, their positions are
no longer independent. Taking into consideration the many possibilities of their relative
displacements make the problem intractable. As shown in Fig. 8, we only consider the
most probable case that the two steps are symmetrically positioned, that is, their midpoints
have the same A1 coordinate. In this case, the possible initial positions of the steps are
A(1) = m1/N , with m1 = −1, . . . , − [N∆A(1) +N∆A(5)]/2+ 1, and A(5) = m5/N , with
m5 = m1+ [N∆A(1)+N∆A(5)]/2. Thus, the number of possible states along the direction
A1 is [N∆A(1)+N∆A(5)]/4. Considering the motion in the 4 directions, the total number of
possible states is [N∆A(0)/2][(N∆A(1)+N∆A(5))/4][N∆A(2)/2][(N∆A(4)+N∆A(6))/4].
Extending the derivation of Eq. (45) to the case of m = 2, we have
σ2
N
=
N
256
{
5〈∆A(0)2〉att + 5
〈
(∆A(1) + ∆A(5))2
4
〉
att
+5〈∆A(2)2〉att + 5
〈
(∆A(4) + ∆A(6))2
4
〉
att
− 16
}
, (47)
where the attractor averages are defined as the Poisson averages weighted by kinetic sam-
pling. For example,
〈∆A(0)2〉att = 〈∆A(0)[∆A(1) + ∆A(5)]∆A(2)[∆A(4) + ∆A(6)]∆A(0)
2〉Poi
〈∆A(0)[∆A(1) + ∆A(5)]∆A(2)[∆A(4) + ∆A(6)]〉Poi . (48)
This requires us to compute Poisson averages such as 〈∆A(t1) · · ·∆A(tk)〉Poi. The following
identity for Poisson averages is useful. Consider a universal set of M elements, and the sizes
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FIG. 8: The relative positions of the steps ∆A(1) and ∆A(5) for the case ∆A(5) > ∆A(1). Here
they are shown symmetrically positioned.
of the sets B1 · · ·Bk and their intersections are Poisson distributed. Then the expectation
of the product |B1| · · · |Bk| is given by
〈|B1| · · · |Bk|〉 =
k∏
r=1
〈|Br|〉+
∑
r<s
〈|Br ∩Bs|〉
∏
u 6=rs
〈|Bu|〉+ · · ·+ 〈|
k⋂
r=1
Br|〉. (49)
This identity can be proved by writing
|B1| · · · |Bk| =
M∑
i1=1
· · ·
M∑
ik=1
Θ(i1 ∈ B1) · · ·Θ(ik ∈ Bk) (50)
where Θ(ir ∈ Br) if ir ∈ Br and 0 otherwise. In the limit ofM approaching infinity, the case
that all ir are distinct yields the expectation value in the first term of Eq. (49), the case that
ir = is corresponds to the second term, and the case that all ir are identical corresponds to
the last term, and so on.
Therefore, we can write
〈∆A(1) · · ·∆A(k)〉 =
(
2
N
)k{ k∏
r=1
br +
∑
r<s
brs
∏
u 6=rs
ba + · · ·+ b1···+k
}
(51)
where br1···ri is the average number of agents simultaneously contributing to the steps
∆A(r1) · · ·∆A(ri).
Consider the attractor sequence in Eq. (8). Tracing the time evolution of the cumulative
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payoffs, the step sizes at t = 2 and t = 6, for example, are given by
∆A(2) =
2
N
∑
a<b
∑
r=±1
Sab(−r − Ωa(2) + Ωb(2))δ(ξ3a − ξ3b − 2r), (52)
∆A(6) =
2
N
∑
a<b
∑
r′=±1
Sab(−r′ − Ωa(2) + Ωb(2) + ξ1a − ξ1b − ξ2a + ξ2b ))δ(ξ2a − ξ2a + 2r′). (53)
Following the analysis of Eq. (39), we find b2 = b6 = ∆/2. To find b26, we note that the
agents shared by the two steps satisfy either r = r′ and ξ1a − ξ1b = ξ2a − ξ2b = −2r, or r = −r′
and ξ1a − ξ1b = 0, ξ2a − ξ2b = 2r. This leads to
b26 =
∑
a<b
∑
r=±1
〈Sab(−r − Ωa(2) + Ωb(2))〉δ(ξ3a − ξ3b − 2r)
×{δ(ξ1a − ξ1b + 2r)δ(ξ2a − ξ2b + 2r) + δ(ξ1a − ξ1b )δ(ξ2a − ξ2b − 2r)}. (54)
The two terms in this expression consist of the contributions to ∆A(2), with the extra
restrictions of ξ1a − ξ1b = ξ2a − ξ2b = −2r, or ξ1a − ξ1b = 0 and ξ2a − ξ2b = 2r respectively. Since
ξµa − ξµb = ±2r and 0 with probabilities 1/4 and 1/2 respectively, we get b26 = 3∆/32. Other
parameters are listed in Table IV. This enables us to find
〈∆A(0)[∆A(1) + ∆A(5)][∆A(4) + ∆A(6)]∆A(2)〉Poi
=
1
8N4
(
32∆4 + 84∆3 +
169
4
∆2 + 2∆
)
. (55)
Other expressions appearing in Eq. (47) can be found similarly. The final result is
σ2
N
=
160∆5 + 1680∆4 + 4772∆3 + 272061
64
∆2 + 7583
8
∆+ 17
64N(32∆3 + 84∆2 + 169
4
∆+ 2)
. (56)
Since the attractor sequence in Eq. (9) yields the same result, Eq. (56) is the sample average
of the variance. When the diversity is low, ∆≫ 1, and Eq. (56) reduces to σ2/N = 5/32piρ,
agreeing with the scaling result of the previous section. When ρ ∼ N , Eq. (56) shows that
the introduction of kinetic sampling significantly improves the theoretical agreement with
simulation results, as shown in Fig. 4. When ρ≫ N , Eq. (56) implies that σ2/N approaches
17/128N . This result is not valid since it is below the lowest possible result of 1/4N when
each step is excuted by the strategy switching of only one agent. The discrepency can be
traced to the approximation that the average number of states along the direction A1 is
[N∆A(1) + N∆(5)]/2, which is not precise for small steps. For example, it can take half
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∆/2 b0, b1, b2, b4, b5, b6
∆/4 b15, b46
∆/8 b01, b06, b12, b14, b16, b24, b45, b56
3∆/32 b02, b04, b05, b25, b26
∆/16 b015, b046, b125, b246
∆/32 b012, b014, b016, b056, b124, b126, b245
3∆/128 b024, b026
∆/64 b025
∆/128 b0124, b0126
∆/64 b0125, b0246
TABLE IV: Values of bt1···tr for the attractor sequence in Eq. (8). The steps at t = 3 and t = 4
are identical, so are the steps at t = 6 and t = 7. Other unlisted parameters are zero.
integer values. We will not pursue this issue further since, in any case, waiting effects have
to be taken into account in analysing the case ρ≫ N .
In summary, we have explained the reduction of variance by the reduction of the fraction
of fickle agents when diversity increases. The theoretical analysis from Sections III to V spans
the 3 regimes of small R, ρ−1 scaling, and kinetic sampling, yielding excellent argreement
with simulations over 7 decades.
It is natural to consider whether the results presented here can be generalized to the
case of the exogenous MG, in which the information µ(t) was randomly and independently
drawn at each time step t from a distribution ρµ = 1/D [6]. This is different from the present
endogenous version of the MG, in which the information is determined by the sequence of
the winning bits in the game history. The similarities and differences between the behavior
of those two versions have been a topic of interest in the literature [6, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 26].
Here we compare their behavior in games of small m using the phase space we introduced.
In the scaling regime, the picture that the states of the game are hopping between hy-
percubes in the phase space remains valid, as shown in Fig. 9 for m = 1. At the steady
state, the attractor consists of hoppings along all edges of a hypercube, in contrast to the
endogenous case, in which only a fraction of hypercube vertices belong to the attractor.
The behavior in the scaling regime depends on the scaling of the step sizes with diversity,
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A0
A1
FIG. 9: An attractor of the exogenous Minority Game for m = 1.
rather than the actual sequence of the steps. Consequently, the behavior is the same as the
endogenous game. In the kinetic sampling regime, the physical picture that larger steps are
more likely to be trapped remains valid, and the behavior remains qualitatively similar to
the endogenous case.
VI. THE FRACTION OF FICKLE AGENTS
This physical picture of the diversity effects is further illustrated by considering the
fraction ffi of fickle agents when the game has reached the steady state. They hold strategy
pairs whose preferences are distributed near zero, and change sign during the attractor
dynamics. As confirmed in Figs. 10 and 11, three regimes of behavior exist.
In the multinomial regime, we can make use of the explicit knowledge about the attractor
sequence and the evolution of the payoffs in the attractor dynamics. Consider the example
of m = 1. We count the type of fickle agents labeled by the strategy pairs a < b and bias ω
for all t, with preferences
ω + Ωa(t)− Ωb(t) = ±1 and ξµa − ξµb = ∓2sgnAµ(t), (57)
where µ = µ∗(t). Equivalently, we have
ω = −Ωa(t) + Ωb(t)− 1
2
(2σ(t)− 1)(ξµ∗(t)a − ξµ
∗(t)
b ), (58)
where Ωa(t) is updated by
Ωa(t+ 1) = Ωa(t) + ξ
µ∗(t)
a [2σ(t)− 1]. (59)
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FIG. 10: The dependence of the fraction of fickle agents on the randomness R at m = 1 and s = 2.
Notations are the same as those of Fig. 3.
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FIG. 11: The dependence of the fraction of fickle agents on the randomness R at m = 2 and s = 2.
Notations are the same as those of Fig. 3.
This enables us to count the types directly from the knowledge of the attractor sequences,
such as Eqs. (7) and (8), without having to know the step sizes. Results for m = 1 and
m = 2 are listed in Tables V and VI respectively. Note that the values in the tables depend
on the convention of ordering the strategies a < b, and here the convention of Eq. (2) is
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adopted. Other conventions may classify the types with bias ω as −ω, or vice versa. Since
the average number of fickle agents of each type is given by Eq. (3), ffi can then be obtained
by summing up the contribution from each type.
ω (a) (b) (c) (d) Total
−3 1 0 0 0 1
−1 5 4 0 3 12
1 1 3 6 3 13
3 0 0 1 1 2
Total 7 7 7 7
TABLE V: The number of types of fickle agents for the attractors (a)-(d) in Fig. 5.
Consider the example of m = 1. Table V shows that there are 7 types of fickle agents
for each attractor shown in Fig. 5. Averaging over initial states, we find that an average of
25/4 types consist of agents with biases ω = ±1, and an average of 3/4 types with ω = ±3,
this result being independent of the ordering of a < b. Since the average number of agents
holding strategy pair a < b is N/8, we have
ffi =
25
32
(
R
R−1
2
)
1
2R
+
3
32
(
R
R−3
2
)
1
2R
. (60)
For m = 2, the number of types of fickle agents for the 16 attractors in Table III are listed
in Table VI. There are 194 types of fickle agents for each attractor. The fraction of fickle
agents is given by
ffi =
1121
1024
(
R
R−1
2
)
1
2R
+
373
1024
(
R
R−3
2
)
1
2R
+
55
1024
(
R
R−5
2
)
1
2R
+
3
1024
(
R
R−7
2
)
1
2R
. (61)
In the scaling regime ρ ∼ 1, we consider the limit of R ∼ N in Eq. (60), and obtain for
m = 1,
ffi =
7
8
√
2
piR
. (62)
Similarly, from Eq. (61), we have for m = 2,
ffi =
97
64
√
2
piR
. (63)
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Attractor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Total
ω = −7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
ω = −5 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 0 1 1 4 0 6 4 9 30
ω = −3 0 3 5 10 8 16 16 23 7 20 22 28 24 33 33 38 286
ω = −1 19 42 42 54 52 59 69 66 76 73 76 75 91 84 94 85 1057
ω = 1 120 87 92 71 93 70 66 59 90 72 72 60 75 55 54 49 1185
ω = 3 48 50 44 46 37 37 36 33 21 25 20 24 4 15 9 11 460
ω = 5 7 11 10 12 4 9 7 9 0 3 3 3 0 1 0 1 80
ω = 7 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Total 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194 194
TABLE VI: The number of types of fickle agents for the 16 attractors in Table III at m = 2.
In the kinetic sampling regime, the fraction of fickle agents for m = 1 is obtained by
replacing (∆A±)2 in the numerator of Eq. (38) by (a0 + a+ + a−)/N , following the notation
used in Eq. (40). The result is
ffi =
14∆2 + 39∆ + 8
8N(2∆ + 1)
. (64)
In the limit of low diversity, ∆ ≫ 1 and Eq. (64) reduces to Eq. (62). In the limit of high
diversity, ∆≪ 1 and ffi approaches 1/N , implying that a single agent would dominate the
game dynamics. However, since waiting effects are neglected, this result is considerably
lower than the simulation results.
For m = 2, the fraction of fickle agents is given by the size of the union set of fickle agents
at all steps,
ffi =
1
N
〈∑
r
br −
∑
r<s
brs +
∑
r<s<u
brsu · · ·
〉
att
(65)
where
〈br1···ri〉att =
〈∆A(0)[∆A(1) + ∆A(5)]∆A(2)[∆A(4) + ∆A(6)]br1···ri〉Poi
〈∆A(0)[∆A(1) + ∆A(5)]∆A(2)[∆A(4) + ∆A(6)]〉Poi . (66)
The result is
ffi =
1552∆4 + 8170∆3 + 80905
8
∆2 + 2801∆ + 64
32N(32∆3 + 84∆2 + 169
4
∆+ 2)
. (67)
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In the limit of low diversity, ∆ ≫ 1 and Eq. (67) reduces to Eq. (63). In the limit of
high diversity, ffi approaches 1/N . However, by tracing the types of fickle agents switching
strategies at each time step, one cannot find any single type of agents who can contribute
to the dynamics of all steps. In fact, the minimum number of agents that can complement
each other to complete the dynamics is 2. For example, one agent can complete the steps
at t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, while the other one can complete the steps t = 5, 6, 7. Hence the
asymptotic limit of ffi = 1/N is not valid. The source of the discrepancy is the same as
that for the invalid result of the asymptotic variance of decisions explained in the previous
section.
As shown in Figs. 10 and 11, the theoretical predictions are confirmed by simulations,
except in the regime of extremely high diversity, where waiting effects have to be taken into
account [16].
VII. CONVERGENCE TIME
Many properties of the system dependent on the transient dynamics also depend on its
diversity. For example, since diversity reduces the fraction of agents switching strategies at
each time step, it also slows down the convergence to the steady state. Hence the convergence
time increases with diversity.
We consider the example of m = 1. The dynamics of the game proceeds in the direction
which reduces the variance [6]. In the multinomial regime, the initial position of Aµ in the
phase space lies in the attractor. Convergence to the steady state is almost instant. Starting
from the initial state 0, the convergence time is 2, 0, 0, 1 in the 4 respective quadrants of
the phase space in Fig. 1. For the initial state 1, the game has the same set of convergence
times, except that the order described is permuted. Hence, the convergence time is 2, 1 and
0 with probabilities 1/4, 1/4 and 1/2 respectively, yielding the average convergence time of
3/4.
In the scaling regime, it is convenient to make use of the rectilinear nature of the motion
in the phase space. We divide the phase space into hypercubes with dimensions
√
2/piR.
Starting from the initial state 0, the convergence paths are shown in Fig. 12. The convergence
time τ of an initial state from inside a hypercube is the number of steps it hops between the
hypercubes on its way to the attractor, as shown in Fig. 13.
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FIG. 12: The convergence paths starting from the initial state 0 in the 4 quadrants of the phase
space for m = 1.
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FIG. 13: The dependence of the convergence time on the initial position in the phase space for
m = 1, starting from the initial state 0. The dimensions of the hypercubes are
√
2/piR. Inset: The
3 regimes of convergence time in the continuum limit.
In general, the convergence time is given by the following cases: (a) 3x+ y + 2 for x ≥ 0
and y ≥ −x−1, where x =
⌊√
piR
2
A1(0)
⌋
and y =
⌊√
piR
2
A0(0)
⌋
; (b) −x−3y−4 for y ≤ −2
and y ≤ −x− 2; (c) −x+ y − 1 for x ≤ −2 and y ≥ −1; (d) y for x = −1 and y ≥ 0; (e) 0
for x = y = −1.
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The average convergence time is then obtained by averging over the Gaussian distribution
of the initial Aµ(0) with mean 0 and variance 1/N . When ρ is small, the initial positions
are mainly distributed around the origin, reducing the convergence time to that of the
multinomial regime. When ρ is large, the initial positions are broadly distributed among
many hypercubes in the phase space, and one can take a continuum approximation as shown
in the inset of Fig. 13. Thus, the average convergence time is given by
τ =
√
piR
2N
{∫ ∞
0
Dx
∫ ∞
−x
Dy(3x+ y) +
∫ 0
−∞
Dy
∫ −y
−∞
Dx(−x− 3y)
+
∫ 0
−∞
Dx
∫ ∞
0
Dy(−x+ y)
}
, (68)
where Dx ≡ dx e−x22 /√2pi is the Gaussian measure. The result is
τ = (2 +
√
2)
√
ρ. (69)
As shown in Fig. 14, there is an excellent agreement between theory and simulations.
The ρ1/2 dependence of the convergence time can be interpreted as follows. In the scaling
regime, since the step size in the phase space scales as 1/
√
R and the initial position of Aµ has
components scaling as 1/
√
N , the convergence time should scale as (1/
√
N)/(1/
√
R) ∼ ρ1/2.
This scaling relation remains valid in the kinetic sampling regime where ρ ∼ N , since kinetic
sampling only affects the description of the attractor, rather than the transient behavior.
VIII. WEALTH SPREAD
Another system property dependent on the transient is the distribution of wealth or
resources, especially those among the frozen agents (that is, agents who do not switch their
strategies at the steady state). Since the system dynamics reaches a periodic attractor,
they have constant average wealth at the steady state. Hence any spread in their wealth
distribution is a consequence of the transient dynamics.
To simiplify the analysis, we only consider the agents who hold identical strategy pairs.
Since they never switch strategies, and both outputs 1 and 0 have equal occurence at the
attractor, their wealth averaged over a period becomes a constant, and their wealth is equal
to the cumulative payoff of the identical strategies they hold.
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In the multinomial regime, the wealth of agents holding identical strategies a is given by
Eq. (16), where kµ(t) are listed in Table I. For m = 1, the periodic average 〈Ωa〉t of the
cumulative payoffs of strategies and their variances 〈〈Ωa〉2t 〉a are listed in Table VII. Thus,
the wealth spread W is the variance 〈〈Ωa〉2t 〉a of 〈Ωa〉t, averaged over the four strategies and
the four attractors, and is equal to 5/8.
ξ1a ξ
0
a (a) (b) (c) (d)
〈Ω0〉t -1 -1 1 0 -1 0
〈Ω1〉t 1 -1 -12 12 -12 -32
〈Ω2〉t -1 1 12 -12 12 32
〈Ω3〉t 1 1 -1 0 1 0
〈〈Ωa〉2t 〉a 58 18 58 98
TABLE VII: The variance 〈〈Ω〉2t 〉a of the periodic average of wealth of the 4 strategies, for the 4
attractors of m = 1.
In the scaling regime, the initial position may be located away from the origin of the
phase space. Using the hypercube picture of the transient motion, we can work out the
cumulative payoffs of the strategies by considering their changes when their initial position
shift to successive neighboring hypercubes. The distribution of wealth variance is shown in
Fig. 15. In general, if x =
⌊√
piR
2
A1(0)
⌋
and y =
⌊√
piR
2
A0(0)
⌋
, then the average wealth
of the 4 strategies in Table VII are x + y + 1, −x + y − 1/2, x − y + 1/2 and −x − y − 1
respectively. This leads to a wealth spread of x2 + y2 + 3x/2 + y/2 + 5/8.
The value of W is then obtained by averaging the wealth spread over the Gaussian
distribution of the initial positions in the phase space, each component Aµ(0) with mean
0 and variance 1/N . When ρ is small, the initial positions are mainly distributed around
the origin, reducing the wealth spread W to the value at the multinomial regime. When ρ
is large, the initial positions are broadly distributed among many hypercubes in the phase
space. Applying the continuum approximation,
W =
piR
2N
∫
Dx
∫
Dy(x2 + y2) = piρ. (70)
The same scaling relation applies to the kinetic sampling regime. As shown in Fig. 16,
agreement between theory and simulations is excellent. Note that the behavior closely
resembles that of the convergence time in Fig. 14, showing that it is a transient behavior.
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FIG. 14: The dependence of the average convergence time on the diversity at m = 1.
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FIG. 15: The dependence of the variance of wealth among the agents holding identical strategies
on the initial position in the phase space for m = 1. The dimensions of the hypercubes are
√
2/piR.
IX. DISCUSSIONS
We have studied the effects of diversity in the initial preference of strategies on a game
with adaptive agents competing selfishly for finite resources. Introducing diversity is both
useful in modeling agent behavior in economic markets, and as a means to improve dis-
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FIG. 16: The dependence of the variance of wealth on the diversity among the agents holding
identical strategies for m = 1.
tributed control. We find that it leads to the emergence of a high system efficiency. We have
made use of the small memory sizes m to visualize the motion in the phase space. Scaling of
step sizes accounts for the dependence of the efficiency on the diversity in the scaling regime
(ρ ∼ 1), while kinetic sampling effects have to be considered at higher diversity, yielding the-
oretical predictions with excellent agreement with simulations up to ρ ∼ N . However, when
diversity increases further, waiting effects have to be considered [16] and will be discussed
in details elsewhere. The variance of decisions decreases with diversity, showing that the
maladaptive behavior is reduced. On the other hand, the convergence time and the wealth
spread increases with diversity.
While the present results apply mostly to the cases of small m, qualitative predictions can
be made about higher values of m. An extension of Eq. (23) shows that when α increases,
the step size becomes smaller and smaller in the asymptotic limit. There is a critical slow
down since the convergence time diverges at αc = pi
−1 = 0.3183 [16]. When α exceeds αc,
the step size vanishes before the system reaches the attractor near the origin, so that the
state of the system is trapped at locations with at least some components being nonzero.
The interpretation is that when α is large, the distribution of strategies become so sparse
that motions in the phase space cannot be achieved by the switching of strategies. This
agrees with the picture of a phase transition from the symmetric to asymmetric phase when
α increases [21]. It is interesting to note that the value of αc is close to the value of 0.3374
obtained by the continuum approximation [6, 27] or batch update [15] using linear payoff
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functions.
Another extension to general m applies to the symmetric phase of the exogenous game.
In this case the attractor can be approximated by a hyperpolygon enclosing the origin of
the phase space. Using a generating function approach, we have computed the variance of
decisions, taking into account the scaling of step sizes and kinetic sampling; the analysis
will be presented elsewhere. The results agree qualitatively with simulations of both the
exogenous and endogenous games, except for values of α close to αc. In fact, when α in-
creases, there is an increasing fraction of samples in which the attractors are more complex
than hyperpolygons. For example, in the endogenous case, there is an increasing fraction
of attractors whose periods are no longer 2D [28]. Instead, their periods become multiples
of the fundamental period 2D. It is remarkable that the population variance is not seri-
ously affected by the structural change of the attractor, probably because the dynamical
description of such long-period attractors have strong overlaps with those of several distinct
attractors of period 2D.
Besides step payoffs, the case of linear payoffs is equally interesting. In fact, the latter case
has also been considered recently, and the variance of decisions is also found to decrease with
diversity [29]. There are significant differences between the two cases, though, indicating that
agents striving to maximize different payoffs cause the system to self-organize in different
fashions. The details will be explained elsewhere.
From the viewpoint of game theory, it is natural to consider whether the introduction
of diversity assists the game to reach a Nash equilibrium, in contrast to the case of the
homogeneous initial condition where maladaptation is prevalent. It has been verified that
Nash equilibria consist of pure strategies [6]. Hence all frozen agents have no incentives to
switch their strategies. In fact, since the dynamics in the attractor is periodic for small
m, with states ±1 appearing once each in response to each historical string, the payoffs
of all strategies become zero when averaged over a period. Thus, the Nash equilibrium is
approached in the sense that the fraction of fickle agents decreases with increasing diversity.
In the limit of ρ≫ N , it is probable that only one fickle agent switches strategy at each step
in the attractor, as predicted by Eq. (64) for the case m = 1. In this case, agents who switch
their decisions cannot increase their payoffs, since on switching, the minority ones would
become losers, and the majority ones would change the minority side to majority and lose.
(Though the fickle agents are not playing pure strategies, this argument implies that their
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payoffs are the same as if they are doing so.) Then a Nash equilibrium is reached exactly.
However, as mentioned previously, waiting effects become important in the extremely diverse
limit, and there are cases that more than one fickle agent contribute to a single step in the
attractor dynamics, and Nash equilibrium cannot be reached.
The combination of scaling and kinetic sampling in accounting for the steady state prop-
erties of the system illustrates the importance of dynamical considerations in describing the
system behavior, at least for small values of m. We anticipate that these dynamical effects
will play a crucial role in explaining the system behavior in the entire symmetric phase,
since when α increases, the state motion in a high dimensional phase space can easily shift
the tail of the cumulative payoff distributions to the verge of strategy switching, leading to
the sparseness condition where kinetic sampling effects are relevant. Due to their generic
nature inherent in multi-agent systems with dynamical attractors formed by the collective
actions of many adaptive agents, we expect that these effects are relevant to minority games
with different payoff functions and updating rules, as well as other multi-agent systems with
adaptive agents competing for limited resources.
The sensitivity of the steady state to the initial conditions has implications to adaptation
and learning in games. First, when the MG is used as a model of financial markets, it shows
that the maladaptive behavior is, to a large extent, an artifact of the homogeneous initial
condition. In practice, when agents enter the market with diverse views on the values of
the strategies, the corresponding initial condition should be randomized, and the market
efficiency is better than previously believed. Second, when the MG is used as a model of
distributed load balancing, the present study illustrates the importance to adopt diverse
initial conditions in order to attain the optimal system efficiency. The effect is reminiscent
of the dynamics of learning in neural networks, in which case an excessive learning rate
might hinder the convergence to optimum [30].
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